That is because all the sides and top regarding the turret are now actually a sheet metal cladding that is thin. There's a diagram of it without the cladding somewhere but basically the actual part that is armoured of turret ...
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- That's because most of the sides and top of the turret are actually a thin sheet metal cladding. There's a diagram of it without the cladding somewhere but basically the actual armoured part of the turret is considerably smaller than it outwardly appears.
- To be fair, I'd be willing to bet the turret isn't quite finished yet. Even if they are going to have a 'shell' around a inner smaller turret core, the shell is really.... lazily done. Futhermore, the vehicle appears to be a straight derivative of the old Ob'yekt 187 design (Which was not coincidentally also designed to be a family of vehicles, and shares many parts with this vehicle) that UVZ has kept mostly classified since the 80s. Which is interesting, because the 'interior' turret drawing posted on here reminds me a ton of the Ob'yekt 187 prototype's turret design.
- 187? 187 was a T-72 upgrade. If you mean 195, I sort of agree (it's not a 'straight' derivative), and I called it: https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/3040wp/supposedly_this_is_russias_new_armata_afv/cppyucc E: disclaimer - as did most of the rest of the internet. It was not, admittedly, all that hard to jump onto the bandwagon after it became clear that the tank would be crew-in-hull. 😛 E2: though holy shit, the little image I dug up at the time seems to have been an almost exact match - all the way up to the placement of the optics, the APS, other electronics, stub ejection hatch and the lack of a coaxial As far the shell is concerned - well, it's definitely designed as a modular vehicle, so if improvement is necessary I'm sure it can be. As it stands, it'll probably be altered before production, but in its current form it largely makes sense - with no bustle or crew to protect, there's no need to heavily armor too much beyond the mantlet, and thus the casing is probably to protect the tank's external electronics from small arms and fragments while also reducing the tank's radar signature (since MMW as a component of FCS looks to be the way of the future).
- No, I mean the 187. The 187 did start as a T-72B upgrade like its cousin the 188/T-72BU/T-90, but by prototype #6 shared very little with the T-72. The hull shape, 'interior' turret shape, roadwheel design, engine, gun, and several other details were shared between T-14 and the final 187 design. I'm not saying the 195 has no influence, as its the same team and the 195 was likely built on top of the 187 experience, with once again the same A-85 engine and next-gen gun. Technically the 2A66 125mm was tested on the 187, as the 2A82 was not yet available. Just food for thought, all of this stuff is still super classified. Supposedly parts of the 195 are included in the T-14, so there is that.
- Yeah, it's fair to say that vehicles 5 and 6 were definitely beyond the point of simply being T-72 derivatives. It's also correct to point out that it informed the development of the 195. But in turn, it's important not to overstate the input of the 187. For one - the hull shaping of the 187 probably informed the protective aspect of the T-14's hull, but not the crew housing. 195 coupled the protective features and engine housing of the 187 with the vital crew-in-hull element, and given that the 187 is better seen as a stepping stone than a defining element of the T-14's design. Roadwheels seem to be quite different on the T-14 to both, really. Concerning the armament - yes, the 187's 2A66 definitely informed the development of the 2A82. On the other hand, the 2A82's development continued in other vehicles, and if Rogozin's hinting at the development of a 152mm T-14 is actually grounded in truth, then there's an obvious line to be drawn between 195 and T-14. Concerning the 'interior' turret shape, I have to admit, I'm at a bit of a loss - there's very little information to go by. However, at the point at which 195 and T-14 are both crew-in-hull tanks, there's obviously going to be more similarity between these two vehicles' turrets in one key sense - though given the 195's projected 152mm armament, the T-14 may well have inherited a 187-derived autoloader. So yeah, 187 informed 195 (and all of later Russian tank development to some extent), so you'll definitely see some of its features reflected in the T-14. But it's a bit harder to draw direct lines between the 187 and T-14 that don't run through the 195. As you say though - a lot of this is classified, so I'm at a bit of a loss. It also doesn't help that my specialty is France and Japan, not the obscure, complex and classified hellhole that is late Cold War and 1990s Russian tank development. If you have any sources for what you've just talked about, I'd be very interested to read through them - would love to know more if somebody has information that'll disprove my current understanding.
- My working assumption is that the 195 and T-14 were parallel developments, with the intention of the 152mm armed 195 to be the service tank. What became the T-14 was likely some plan B, with bits of the 195 folded in when that failed. The development trees look a bit like an MC Escher drawing. Tank net has some pics of the 187 #6 model, and some of the hulks stored at Kubinka, but details on both of these are nearly nonexistant. Sources are confused and often contradictory, Fofanov is no longer updating and has not for quite some time, and there is no Hunnicut to write a book that cuts through the mess. A hypothetical development path would be 187 -> 195 / "187v2" Plan B (pure conjecture here based on UVZ's prior dev patters of a main and a backup) -> Armata. I could be totally and utterly wrong, and this could just be a renamed 195. But the more blocky, smaller turret suggests that after the more radical 195 failed, they went back to a more 187 inspired vehicle while keeping the hull and system improvements developed during the 195. Poor black eagle, nowhere to be seen. All of the sources out there are various Russian webpages, nothing authoritative. It really is a pain to try to piece this together. Ovtaga has the best write-up on the 187 (Which is sort of damning with faint praise, really): http://otvaga2004.ru/tanki/istoriya-sozdaniya/drugoy_t90/ There isn't even that much known on the 195, sadly. I really wish I had more sources to give out.
- I'm back! Basically, the long and the short of it is, you can't draw direct continuity in Russian tank development from the 80s to the 2010s without taking the political-economic climate into account. Of particular note is the 90s and how the military-industrial complex crawled out of that particular 'decade of shame' with a steadily worsening limp, something that essentially came to a head in 2010. To tl;dr it a bit, as you're probably aware, Russia post-Cold War wasn't in great shape; naturally, that fed into the ability of the defense-industrial complex to function effectively. While research continued, it didn't have quite the R&D funding or higher direction of the Soviet era, and thus most of what they were doing was an aimless continuation of USSR-era projects. Eventually, the T-80 fell out of favour after Chechnya, and Uralvagonzavod found itself sitting on top of a contract to produce T-72BUs (hastily relabelled the T-90 to dissociate it from the well-publicised disaster of an operation that was First Grozny) into the next millenium, further bolstered by the procurement in '99 of an upgraded T-90 that brought its KEPs up to snuff, and then the 2001 decision by India to purchase T-90s too. It was enough to keep the company going, and presumably they'd been given the green light to go ahead with Obiekt 195 as well. 187's development fed into both the T-90 and the 195, but the 90, even in its upgraded iteration, didn't feature some of the more radical features of the 187's later model. The expectation was probably that the 195, not T-90 (despite its redesigned hull and turret) would succeed the 187 in that regard. But then, there's a break in the linearity, courtesy of that 'limp' I referred to earlier. That comes in 2010 - largely because of the appointment of Anatoly Serdyukov as defence minister in 2010, the effects of which were huge. As well as the host of organisational reform that followed, the Ministry began to get combative in its industry relations too. 2010's where it comes to a head - after some combative comments (one good example is the deputy defense minister calling the BMP-3 a 'coffin', which the arms exporting concerns were very displeased by), the Ministry cancelled its BMP-3 buy, refuses to purchase the T-95 or BMPT, and publicly criticises the T-90. Their objection is twofold - Russian equipment isn't good enough, and to boot it's actually quite expensive. So, the Obiekt 195 is cancelled. Serdyukov gets fired in 2012 - a combination of his treading on too many fingers and Putin's realisation after the 2011 elections that representative democracy was a clear and present danger and that he had to court the military and defence industry as electorates, not just bureaucracies. It also doesn't help that UVZ gets a lot of political capital in 2011 when one of Putin's trusted aides gets assigned its chairmanship, which gives them a strong voice (for six months, but a crucial six months at that) in Putin's ear. He's gone, but the general shift towards modernisation isn't - the commander in chief of the Army has already taken the opportunity in 2011 to criticise the industry, something the military hadn't done before, and in 2012 the Deputy Prime Minister indicates that Russia will demand the 'best new weapons'. On top of that, the Russians are gradually formulating a more coherent approach to their defence modernisation, taking into account the pressures of its professionalisation and the need for rapid deployability to respond to a variety of threats, culminating in programs like Ratnik for the Ground Forces. That's key - essentially, UVZ are told in 2010 that the 195, the culmination of their R&D, isn't enough. On top of that, a graddually clearer vision for Russian defence modernisation guiding procurement, requirements have gradually changed. It's not that the 195 was a fundamentally bad concept and they reverted to the 187 as a 'second choice' (they stuck, after all, with an unmanned turret and other 195 design attributes) - rather, the 187 fed into the 195, and they were told that the 195 wasn't good enough. So during that gap between, say, 2011 and 2015, both UVZ and the Army filled their mutual requirements with filler projects like the T-72B3 modernisation packages (which kept UVZ more or less solvent), while UVZ worked on taking the 195 and making it better. Hence, I think that 187 -> 195 -> T-14 is a more likely progression than 187 -> 195 -> 187 again -> T-14 because the 195 was likely built from the 187 anyway, and the Defense Ministry's objections weren't with the 195 specifically, but with their having to buy Cold War equipment in general at 21st century prices. So they took the 195 proposal, stuck with the core design tenets (unmanned turret, well-protected hull derived from the 187, automotive parts like the A-85 engine that the 187 started with and that fed into the 195), while most likely altering the tank so that it came with a more comprehensive package of electronics, at a lower weight range, with more modularity/upgradeability and so on. Price was definitely a big issue too - I don't get the impression that the defense ministry was satisfied with the prices of the first lot of vehicles, certainly. tl;dr again: Russia's problem in '10 when it cancelled the 195 wasn't necessarily the 195 concept itself, but the fact that they were being forced to buy Soviet era materiel, more or less, reflected in a blanket rejection of products from the Obiekt 195 to the BMP-3. The T-14 probably marks a shift away from both the 187 and 195 in that regard, with UVZ responding to the Defence Ministry's objections alongside other major firms (Kalashnikov, Kurganmashzavod etc) by presenting a more acceptable 'modernisation' option in line with a more coherent Russian vision for the future of their military, and utilising the technology developed on the base of both the 187 and 195 in the development of a somewhat different vehicle that reflects the contemporary, and not two-decades outdated, concerns and wants of the Russian military (deployability, modularity, electronics etc). It's speculation on my part, but I feel that the break in 2010 with the defence industry is an underappreciated shift in Russian procurement policy; with ground equipment in particular, it appears to have marked a shift away from the purchases they'd been happy enough to make since the end of the Cold War towards a more coherent program for materiel acquisitions informed by a clear vision for modernisation into the next decade.
- (watch this space - I actually have a bit of insight into all this and the politics behind UVZ, but I won't have time to post a full reply until a bit later)
- Huh. That explains a lot actually. What's the purpose of a cover that takes up additional space?
- No no, then it would be an American tank. Read more comments